DID THE GOVERNMENT ACQUIRE TITLE TO GERMAN MERCHANT VESSELS SEIZED DURING THE
LATE WAR?
A recent order (September 29, 1922) entered by Circuit
Judge Hough, sitting as District Judge in the Southern District
of New York, following a suggestion of want of jurisdiction,
filed by the United States of America, in the matter of the SS.

(Littlejohn & Co. v. United States of America),
formerly the German-owned steamship "NECKAR," presents for
"AxTIGONE"

ultimate judicial determination a question which has engaged the
attention of students of International Law for some time.
Broadly stated the question is:
"Whether German owniers of merchant vessels which were
sekced by officers of the United 'States when the United States entered the war on April 7, 1917, sere ever legally divested of their
title to these vessels?"
The order in terms directs the trial of the issue of fact as
to whether at the time of the injury complained of, the SS. "AN-*
TIGOXE" was owned by the United States, and whether on said
date title to said vessel was vested in the possession of the United
States," to the end that from the facts found the legal inference
of o-nership or property in the United States -may be drawn by
the Court
The "NECmAR," when war was declared with Germany
(April, 1917) was owned by the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company, and was, while lying in the Port of Baltimore, seized by
United States officials. It was thereafter manned by a Navy
crew and used for army transport service, and while in such use
came into collision with a British merchant ship.
A libel was filed and the Government suggested want of
jurisdiction in the Court, basing this position, presumably upon
the decision of the Supreme Court in the "XVESTERN MAID" 1
(decided January 3, 1922), a case originating in the Eastern
'United States v. Thompson, U. S. Adv. Ops. 185 (1922).
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District of Pennsylvania, and. resulting in the granting of a writ
of prohibition from the Supreme to the District Court, which had
entertained a libel for a tort committed by the vessel while carrying food-stuffs to the civilian population of Europe, and manned
by a Navy crew, the vessel having been thereafter delivered to
the United States Shipping Board.
In the "WESTER

MAID," however, there was no question as

to the title or ownership of the United States in the vessel at the
time the collision occurred, but the recent order of Judge Hough
sharply presents the question of whether or not the SS. "ANTiGONE"'as
in fact legally owned by the United States.
If, on the trial of this issue, the decision should be adverse
to the Government, its effect, so far as the seizure of some
ninety-one vessels of German ownership is concerned, would be
very far-reaching, although the right of the United States to retain these vessels, at least until all of the claims of United States
citizens against the Germyian Government have been. satisfied,
seems to have been secured by the treaty of the United States
with the German Empire, signed at Berlin, August 25, 1921.
Nevertheless, all of these vessels, while interned, became subject
to numerous liens for supplies, etc., furnished by American citizens before they were taken over by the United States, and a
number may be subject to maritime liens for collision, etc.
It is assumed that the Proctors for the libellants in the case
before Judge Hough, propose to attack the method pursued by
the Government in taking over the German vessels, and to assert
that the proceedings taken by the Government did not vest legal
title to the vessels in the United States Government.
It is proposed, in this article, to examine some-of the legal
considerations involved in the methods pursued by the United.
States Government in taking over this vessel property.
Until the advent of the Great War, which upset so many
rules of International Law, theretofore considered fixed and
established, the consensus of legal opinion as to the method of
acquiring title to enemy vessels involved the conception of a legal
determination by a Prize Court.
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Property is taken or destroyed by a State either under the
right of eminent domain, which involves the doctrine of compensation; or, in case of war, under the doctrine of necessity,
which doctrine has reference generally to the property of citizens; or, enemy property is taken or forfeited as an act of war.
The taking under the doctrine of necessity is, and of right
should be, invoked as the supreme law for the salvation of the
people.
"The right arising out of extreme necessity is a natural right
older than states. It is the right of self-defence, of self-preservation, and has no connection whatever with super-eminent right (eminent domain) of the state. The one may be fettered by constitutional limitations; the other is beyond the reach of constitutions." 2
Where property is taken or destroyed under urgent necessity, or under an immediate and impending danger, it is the
emergency which gives the right and justifies the taking, and no
obligation rests upon the government to make compensation,3 but
the distinction between this taking and one under Eminent domain
is pointed out by William Lawrence, Esquire, in an article in the
American Law Registcr in 18744 in the following language:
"One reason for bearing in mind the clear distinction between
the right of eminent domain and the law of necessity, is that where
property is taken by virtue of the former 'just compensation' is to be
made, while under the latter, neither individuals, on common-law
principles, nor the Government on principles of public law, incur any
such liability."
In all cases involving the taking or destruction of property
other than under an urgent and pressing necessity, the essential
ingredient to the acquisition of title to the property taken is
proper judicial proceedings; that is to say, there must be some
certain statement of the facts upon which seizure is made and
forfeiture is sought; some notice of the proceedings to the parties
'Grant v. United States, i Ct. Claims 45 (1863).
2United States v. Railroad, i2o U. S. z38 (1886).
"22 A. L R. 410.
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in interest; some opportunity to be heard; and some judicial determination of the question. 5
As Mr. Justice Story points out 6 this rule is founded on
the first principles of natural justice, and if a forfeiture is made
otherwise than in this manner, it contains none of the elements
of a judicial proceeding and does not deserve the respect of any
foreign nation as a tribunal.
With these principles in mind, let us look at the situation
surrounding the taking into possession of the various German
vessels in the ports of the United States at the outbreak of the
war.
When war was declared (April 7, 1917) some ninety-one
vessels, flying the German flag, which had sought our ports at
the outbreak of the Great War, and had thereafter been interned,
were seized either by the War Department, the-Navy Department, or the Treasury Department, under the'war powers of the
Executive.
Thereafter Congress authorized the President to take over
the immediate title and posscssion of these vessels (May r2,
1917). Subsequently the Navy Department was authorized by
executive order to take over certain specified vessels.
It is to be notca that the Resolution of Congress provides for
the taking into possession and the taking of title to the vessels.
The two things are not synonymous.. Possession does not necessarily include title, although title may include the right to possession.
That some regard was had to the rights of the owners of
the vessels, is evidenced by Section 2 of the Resolution above
referred to (May 12, l917):"
"SEc. 2. That the Secretary of the Navy be, ahd he is hereby,
authorized and directed to appoint, subject to the approval of the
President, a board of survey, whose duty it shall be to ascertain the
actual value of the vessel, its equipment, appurtenances, and all
Justice Story in Bradstreet v. Neptune Tisurance Co., 3 Sumn. 6oo (U.
S. C. C. 1839).
'Bradstreet v. Neptune Insurance Co., -upra, in Note 5.
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property contained therein, at the time of its taking, and to make a
written report of their findings to the Secretary of the Navy, who
shall preserve such report with the records of his Department. These
findings shall be considered as competent evidence in all proceedings
on any claim for compensation'
It may be that under the doctrine of eminent domain, the
Government could take not only the possession, but title, to the
property. This would, of course, involve the doctrine of compensation, which was apparently in the mind of Congress when
Section 2 of the Resolution, above quoted, wag writteni into the
law.

Aside from the question of treaty obligations, 7 the attitude
of the Government at the time found various expressions. The
Secretary of State on February 8, 1917, used the following
language:
"The Government of the United States will in no circumstances
take advantage of a state of war to take possession of property to
which international understandings and the recognized law of the
land give it no just claim or title. It will scrupulously respect all
private rights alike of its own citizens and the subjects of foreign
states."

And 'Mr. Alexander, Chairman of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, is reported in the Congressional Record
of 'May 9, 1917, page 212o, as saying:

if we pursue our policy in the future as in-the past,
we will compensate these owners for these vessels, but at this time,
early in the war, aid w-ith conditions changing from day to day, the
equities shifting, it will be time enough in the view of the Senate
and in the view of the administration, and in the view of the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries to adjust these equities
after peace has been declared."
Constitutional considerations enter into the discussion. The
Fifth Amendment suggests the necessity of judicial proceedings
before even Congress could forfeit the title to enemy vessels; alTreaty of 1799 with Prussia, as revived by Article XII of the Treaty
of 18,8.
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though if the vessels were owned by corporations, the necessity
would not seem to be so apparent. The Constitution grants to
Congress, in addition to the power to declare war, the power
to make rules "concerning captures on land and water." 8
It would seem that under the law and the Constitution the
taking of possession was a distinct and different concept from
the acquisition of title. Does the Constitution in giving Congress power to make rules concerning captures on land and water
empower Congress to authorize the executive, without more, to
take both possession and title to enemy property, or is the Congressional power limited by the usage of nations and the international rules?
The proceeding to pass title is strictly one in ren and the
common usage of nations for centuries past recognized only the
Prize Court as the competent tribunal to decree forfeiture. Certainly forfeiture without condemnation and adjudication did not
pass title as against the world. This was the doctrine laid down
by Lord Stowell in the "Flad Oyen." 9 In that case a vessel was
restored to its owner because no sentence of condemnation as
prize had taken place.
The Supreme Court laid down a similar doctrine, where an
attempt was made by our Navy forces in Mexico to forfeit a vessel and to pass title. In that case Mr. Chief Justice Taney said:
"The courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico during the
war by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing more
than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order
in the conquered territory, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while it was occupied by the American arms.
They vere subject to the military power, and their decisions under
its control, whenever the commanding officer thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United States, and had no
right to adjudicate upon a question of prize or no prize. And the
sentence of condemnation in the court at Monterey is a nullity and
can have no effect upon the rights of any party." 10
'Article I, Section 8, Clause ixi.
'1 C. Rob. 135 (Eng. 1799).
Jecker v. Montgomery, s4 U. S. 515 (1%1).
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'These cases but state the universal rule; and even during
the Great War, Great Britain put through the Prize Court all
vessels whether in port or not, and whether confiscated or requisi-,
tioned. Italy followed the same practice, and later in the war
when vessels were confiscated in retaliation for submarine outrages, put these vessels through the Prize Court. Ifi the Russian-Japanese War, the Japanese took the same course.
During our own Civil War, during the Mexican War, during the War of 1812, and in the Revolutionary War, Prize Courts
were the tribunals recognized in this country as the proper ones
to declare forfeiture,"' and our present Judicial Code provides
for judicial determination on seizures for forfeitures.
Indeed, Section 4624 of the Revised Statutes 1 2 seems to
outline the proper practice. This section provides:
"SEc. 4624. (Appraisal, etc., of property taken for Government.) Whenever any captured vessel, arms, munitions, or other material are taken for the use of the United States before it comes
into the custody of the prize court, it shall be surveyed, appraised,
and inventoried, by persons as competent and impartial as can be
obtained, and the survey, appraisement and inventory shall be sent
to the court in which proceedings are to be had; and if taken afterward, sufficient notice shall first be given to enable the court to have
the property appraised for the protection of the rights of the'claimants and captors. In all cases of prize-property taken for or appropriated to the use of the Government, the Department for whose use
it is taken or appropriated shall deposit the value thereof with the
assistant treasurer of the United States nearest to the place of the
session of the court, subject to the order of the court in the cause."
But while the decision in Brown v. United States,"3 would
seem to require judicial proceeditigs before title passed, even
though Congress had authorized forfeiture of the property, yet,
on the whole, the opinion of the court in this case may lend support to the doctrine that the United States may disregard all rules
based on usage or international law and act only upon political
considerations, taking the property df the enemy under the fiat
"Act of August 6, x861, Chap. 6o, i2 Stat. 319'
"S Fed. Stat. Ann. (2d Ed.), p. 3r6.
138 Cranch. (U. S.) nio (1814).
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of the Legislature wherever found and without recourse to judicial proceedings.
It is interesting to contrast the language used in the discussion which prevailed between the Justices.
Mr. Justice Story, dissenting, said:
"Until the title be divested by some overt act of the Government and some Judicial sentence the property would unquestionably
remain in the Bgritish owners, and if a peace should intervene, it
would1 be completely beyond the reach of subsequent condemnation."
Chief justice Marshall said:
"That war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons
and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded." 25
He stated that the rule may have been mitigated in modern
times, but the mitigation could not impair the right, which remained undiminished; and proceeded to state that when the sovereign chose to bring his authority into existence, the judicial department must give effect to its will.
And the great Chief justice also adverted to the fact that it
did not appear in the case under discussion that the seizure was
made under any instructions from the President of the United
States, nor was there evidence of the seizure having hig sanction,
thus indicating' that there was in his mind the thought that had
the seizure been made directly under the instructions of the
President, or with his sanction, the judgment of the court might
have been to some extent at least affected, and it would appear
from the whole of his opinion that there existed little doubt in
the mind of the Chief justice of the power of the Government
acting through Congress.
It has been judicially determined that confiscation and destruction of property may be decreed by the Legslative depart"Brown v. United States, supra, in Note 13, at p. x48.
" Brown v. United States, supra, in Note 13, at p. i2z
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ment without resort to judicial proceedings. The power has been
limited to property of little value, but such limitation impliedly
admits the principle.
In L-aseton v. Steele,"" our Supreme Court upheld a statute
of the State of New York which provided for the summary
destruction of fish nets used in the waters of the State, sustaining the provision under the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution, on the theory that in a proper case such power
existed in the Legislature, particularly where the value of the
property was not large. .But in this case the court said that the
doctrine could not be extended to vessels.'
The matter must be viewed in any circumstances from the
standpoint of sovereign power.
Mr. Justice Field, in the Chinese Exclusion Case,1 7 said:
"To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggre3sion and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to
be subordinated. . . . The Government, possessing the powers
which are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed with
authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be
called forth, and its determination, so far as the subjects affected are
concerned, is necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and
officers. . . . The existence of war would render the necessity
of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing."
It is unnecessary to recall the situation which confronted our
Government in the Spring and Summer of 1917. Sufficient it is
to say that there was a demand for ships; ships of any kind, size,
or means of propulsion. In this crisis a joint resolution of Congress authorized the President of the United States to take over
immediate possession and title to certain German merchant ships
then in our harbors. This the President proceeded to do.
Of course, under the practice and procedure in the case of
prize immediate possession could always be taken and the matter
of title left to a future determination in prize proceedings, and,
" Lawton v. Steele, z52 U. S. r33 (1894).
i3o U. S. 581, 6o6 (x889).
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therefore, the urgency 'f the situation loses its force as an argu:ment of necessity. This is the practice outlined in Section 4624 of
the Revised Statutes.
But was not the method pursued reasonably necessary and
appropriate and not unduly oppressive? Was it not within the
great test laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloclh v.
Maryland? I

"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
William I. Conlen.
Philadelpia.
is4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 42

(i8r9).

